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Abstract. Providing a performance measure of any firm is a crucial issue, not only for the stakeholders of the firm, but also 
for policy makers, labor unions, and economists. The relevant performance measures should consider the objectives of the 
firm’s owners. The ownership structure of cooperatives is different from that of investors owned firms, which in principle 
implies the need of different tools to measure their performance. Typically, however, the performance of cooperatives and 
investor owned firm is mostly compared using the same approach. In this study, we use Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
to compare the performance of dairy cooperatives and investor owned firms in major European dairy producing countries 
using a traditional approach, which views both types of firms as cost minimizers, and an alternative approach, which 
considers the objectives of the cooperatives.  In the alternatives approach, two hyperbolic models were evaluated, one of 
them consider the firms to expand both output production and use of material to address the objective of the owners of the 
cooperatives. The performance of the cooperatives changes across the two approaches form being out performed by IOFs 
using the traditional approach to outperforming IOFs when using an approach that is in line with the objective of the 
cooperative.  
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1.  Introduction 
Dairy cooperatives in Europe have played an important role in the dairy processing sector. In major dairy 
producing-countries, such as Denmark, the Netherlands and Ireland, cooperatives process more than 85% of the 
total milk production (Van Bekkum, 2001). However, the performance of the cooperatives firms (CFs) and their 
ability to function efficiently in competitive and global markets in comparison to the Investor Owned Firms 
(IOFs) have been long debated in literature (see: Soboh et al., 2009). The  debate has intensified due to major 
trends in the past few decades such as globalization, changes in related policies, international trade liberalization 
and  treaties,  and  changes  in  consumers’  preferences  (Soboh  et  al.,  2009).  Recently,  due  to  the  expected 
abolishment of the quota system in 2015 and the current financial crisis, the debates are intensified on the 
competitive  strength  of  the  CFs  and  IOFs,  and  CFs  are  argued  to  have  more  suitable  and  sustainable 
organizational structure than IOFs (Van Campen, 2009).   
Cooperatives are not easily defined (Hind, 1999) and do not have a standard ownership structure like IOFs 
(Chaddad  and  Cook,  2004  ).  However,  there  is  a  general  consensus  in  the  literature  that  cooperatives  are 
generally seen as user-controlled, user-owned and user-beneficit firm (Soboh et al., 2009). In the case of dairy 
CFs, this emphasis on members’ control, ownership and benefit to members is reflected in the milk payment to 
members which includes, in addition to milk price, a proportion of the dividends (Zwanenberg et al., 1993). The 
members’ role and objective in their cooperatives is a major reason for debating the argument and empirical 
findings that CFs are technically and economically inefficient when compared to the IOFs. Those who advocate 
CFs  model  reject  this  argument  and  demand  a  different  approach  to  evaluate  the  performance  of  the  CFs 
empirically. For instance, Van Dijk and Klep (2005) argued that CFs have double-objectives one of which is to 
benefit members while the other is to healthily function in the competitive market. Additionally, the members’ 
control on the CFs investment decisions,  makes the  CFs less  willing to be involved in risky ventures and 
therefore more immune to cope with policy changes (Soboh et al., in progress) or economical crises (Van 
Campen, 2009). It is argued, on one hand, that the CFs are more beneficial to farmers and the rural development 
than profit  maximizing IOFs (Chavez, 2003). On the other hand, Hind (1999) argued that the control and 
ownership of members of the cooperative cause CFs to be less oriented to value added production, less efficient 
in  input  use  (especially  members’  product)  and  more  focused  on  exploiting  economies  of  scale.  Hence, 
cooperatives are argued to be less technical, scale and cost efficient.  
  Theoretically, both arguments, of those who advocate the cooperative form of firms and those who 
criticize it, are defendable but hardly disputed. However, empirically- as far as we know- there is no concrete 
evidence of any of the arguments neither for such comparison in general nor for the European dairy CFs in 
comparison to their IOFs counterpart in particular(see: Soboh et al., 2009). 
In this study, using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), we first analyze technical, scale and allocative 
efficiency of dairy processing firms using the traditional efficiency techniques. Second we use a hyperbolic 
approach to dairy cooperatives and IOFs with a special emphasis on the role of raw materials (i.e. mainly milk 
deliveries by the farmers) in two models. The first model, measures the hyperbolic technical efficiency of the 
firms assuming they expand output and contract materials and other inputs simultaneously. The second model, 
measures the hyperbolic technical efficiency of the firms assuming they expand both output and materials and   2 
contract the other inputs. These two hyperbolic measures provide us with alternative approaches to evaluate the 
technical efficiency taking into account the cooperative general objective to serve the interests of their members 
as the major (if not the only) suppliers of materials. Subsequently, we use bootstrapping technique to allow for 
statistical inference.   
This paper uses Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), outlined in (Färe et al., 1994). The DEA was used by many 
authors to evaluate and to compare the performance of cooperatives to IOFs, such as Doucouliagos and Hone 
(2000 ), Singh, et.al. (2001) and Boyle (2004). However, this study contributes to the literature by addressing 
the nature of the cooperative which aims to serve its members, which is done in two ways. First, this study 
provides the first empirical comparison of the technical, scale and allocative efficiency of European dairy CFs 
and IOFs. The results of large IOFs and CFs are presented in more detail. Second, this paper presents an 
alternative approach to measuring technical and scale efficiency of cooperatives that explicitly, i.e. an approach 
that is in line with the different objectives of CFs versus IOFs. 
The remainder of the paper is presented as follows. The next section presents the DEA models. This is followed 
by a discussion of the data of the dairy processing firms. In section four we present the results of the DEA 
models. The conclusion is provided in the fifth section. 
 
2.  DEA Models for Modeling Efficiency of the Firms  
The performance of dairy cooperatives in comparison to IOFs has been studies by others using DEA. 
Doucouliagos and Hone (2000 )used DEA to assess the technical efficiency of Australian dairy processing firms 
using  data  over  the  period  1969-1996.  Their  results  show  a  modest  technical  progress  and  indicate  some 
convergence in productivity levels across regions. They conclude that the Australian dairy sector is operating at a 
high level of technical efficiency. Singh, et.al. (2001) applied DEA to compare the performance of the dairy 
cooperatives to the private sector in India. They concluded that cooperatives are more cost efficient than IOFs. 
Boyle (2004) investigated the economic efficiency of Irish dairy cooperatives over the period 1961-1987. He 
argued that cooperatives are not efficient for two reasons: (a) cooperatives suffer from technical inefficiency 
because of principal-agent problems and allocation inefficiency due to horizon problems; (b) cooperatives prices 
for raw milk are inefficient. Each of the above studies used the same approach on CFs and IOFs to measure and 
compare their performance.   
In this study we use two different approaches to evaluate the performance of the cooperatives. The first 
is the traditional, is measuring the overall efficiency of the firms and decomposes it input oriented technical, 
scale and allocative efficiency. The traditional approach views the firms as cost minimizers and ignores the 
different nature of CFs and IOFs. The second, i.e. the alternative approach, is measuring technical efficiency of 
the firms assuming that firms expand output(s) and materials and simultaneously contract other inputs with equal 
proportions. 
  
2.1 Traditional Efficiency Approach and Models 
  In this approach we measure the input-oriented technical, scale and allocative efficiency. The models 
view the CFs and the IOFs as cost minimizing firms, in which all inputs, including the materials, are being 
contracted.   
The input-oriented technical efficiency, in which inputs and materials are contracted while keeping 
output at fixed level, is expected to be higher for IOFs than for the CFs. For the IOFs, as owners are solely 
interested in profit, materials- mainly raw milk- are considered to be a regular input, while materials for the CFs 
are more complex and are not viewed as simply an input since the suppliers of raw milk are themselves the 
owners. The owners of the CFs, the suppliers of raw milk, aim to maximize their return by obtaining a high 
payment for raw materials while at the same time- like other firms- want cost minimization for all other inputs 
and production factors. Therefore, the cooperatives are expected to have a lower value of the input-oriented 
technical efficiency.  
The scale efficiency of the CFs is expected to be lower than that of the IOFs. The CFs are not totally 
free in choosing their  scale  of operations, by default  they are obliged  to process and  market all  members’ 
production. IOFs on the other hand choose the optimal scale to process the quantity of material that maximizes 
their profit.  
The average allocative efficiency of the CFs is expected to be lower than of the IOFs. CFs are not 
assumed to be profit maximizers or cost minimizers; instead, they aim to minimize a different objective function 
which aims to pay higher milk price than the IOFs, in addition to minimizing all other costs. And since IOFs are 
profit maximizers, hence cost minimizers as well, they are expected to have a higher value of the allocative 
efficiency (equal to one), while CFs, as they are not cost minimizers for their raw material, are expected to have 
lower allocative efficiency than IOFs.   
Before representing the linear programming needed to measure the traditional models, to measure the 
input-oriented  technical  efficiency  and  scale  and  allocative  efficiencies,  it  is  necessary  to  introduce  some   3 
notations.  Consider a firm that uses a vector of inputs (x) and a vector of raw material (m) to produce a vector of 
output (y). 
The DEA input-oriented model to measure the technical efficiency for firms i, i=1,...,N,  that produce 
one output  using three inputs including the raw material is calculated form the following non-linear program: 
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Where vrs f  is the overall technical efficiency score  ]) 1 , 0 [ ( Î f for the i th firm, Y is the (1×N) vector of observed 
output, M is the (1×N) of observed use of raw material, X is the matrix of observed inputs andl  is a (Nx1) 
vector of intensity variables (firm weights). The constraint  1 ' 1 = l N (with  1 N being an Nx1 vector of ones) 
implies the sum of the lambdas equals one and allows for a variable return to scale (VRS) technology. Here, the 
overall technical efficiency  measures the  minimum proportional contraction in observed inputs (x) and raw 
material (m) subject to the constraints imposed by the observed inputs and the technology. This is illustrated in 
Figure 1 line (1). 
To measure the scale efficiency for the two  models above  we  modify both  models to exclude  the 
constraint 1 ' 1 = l N
1. This will produce  crs f - the input oriented technical efficiency assuming constant return t 
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where  i m &  and  i x & denote material cost and other inputs quantities, respectively, of the ith firm that minimize the 
cost given the input prices ( x w ) and raw material prices ( m w ). The overall efficiency is defined as the ratio of 




C & , where 
i C is the actual cost defined as  ) ( i m i x m w x w +  and  i C &  is the 
minimum cost which is obtained by solving model (2). 
The overall efficiency 
i OE  of the dairy processing firm is calculated as following: 
 
i i i i AE SE TE OE ´ ´ =                                                                                                              (3) 
In which  i TE  is input oriented technical efficiency assuming variable return to scale, 
i SE  is the scale efficiency 
and  i AE is the allocative efficiency of the firm (i). 
                                                 
1 We don’t write down the models of the constant return to scale here to avoid repetition.   4 
  
2.2 Hyperbolic Models to incorporate CFs Nature 
In this alternative approach we consider two hyperbolic models. In the first model, we measure the 
hyperbolic technical efficiency considering the firm to radially expand output and radially contract inputs and 
materials simultaneously with equal proportions; this is presented in model 4 which is illustrated in Figure 1 with 
line (4). In the second model, we measure the hyperbolic technical efficiency considering an aspect of the CFs 
which  aim,  not  only  to  expand  the  total  turnover,  but  also  materials,  while  contracting  all  other  inputs 
simultaneously with equal proportions (see model 5).  In the first model (model 4), we view each firm (of both 
types) as an IOF, while in the second model (model 5), we view each firm (of both types) as a cooperative. 
 Our  expectation  is  that,  on  average,  the  CFs  will  score  lower  with  the  first  hyperbolic  technical 
efficiency model rather than with the second one. This is due to the nature of the CFs which is assumed to 
maximize  the  revenue  of  the  milk  delivered  by  its  members  (raw  milk  which  makes  up  the  major  part  of 
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The technical efficiency in which inputs (x) are contracted and both output (y) and raw material (m) are 
simultaneously expanded is measured in model 5 and illustrated in Figure1 with line (5). The technical efficiency 






































                   (5)                                    
  
Figure 1 illustrates the three models (the traditional and the two alternative ones).  For simplification, 
we use two dimensions: output (y) and materials (m). Line (1), in Figure 1, illustrates the traditional situation 
where material is contracted while output is held fixed. Lines (4) and (5) illustrate the two hyperbolic models, 
where line (4), in Figure 1, presents the situation where materials is contracted while output is expanded, while 
line (5), in Figure1, presents the situation where material and output are expanded. Given the assumed objective 
of CFs to pay a high price for inputs delivered by their members (materials), the cooperatives are expected to be 
located further to the right corner, while IOFs are expected to be located left upper corner in Figure 1. 
 
    
Figure 1: The Direction of the different Models.   5 
                               
2.3 Bootstrap Method 
 The bootstrap method is an established statistical resampling method used to perform inference in complex 
problems. If the data generating process (DGP) characterises the true data generation well and is mimicked in the 
resampling  simulation,  then  the  bootstrap  method  is  well-performed  in  validating  statistical  inference.  The 
bootstrap is  mainly to approximate the sampling distribution of the estimator (in  this  study: input-oriented, 
hyperbolic and scale efficiencies). To approximate this sampling distribution we use the empirical distribution of 
the  resampled  estimate,  which  is  obtained  from  the  Monte  Carlo  resampling  distribution  of  the  estimation 
procedure (in this case the DEA). Repeated re-samples are obtained from an estimate of the DGP are used in the 
estimation procedure to produce repeated estimates (Lothgren and Tambour, 1999).  
In this study, we use the bootstrapping method suggested by Simar and Wilson (2007) to avoid sample 
biases of the technical and hyperbolic efficiency measures, and we use the bootstrapping approach in Lothgren 
and  Tambour  (1999)  to  correct  for  data  biases  when  measuring  scale  efficiencies.  We  use  Hall  percentile 
intervals based on differences to construct 95% confidence interval for input-oriented and hyperbolic technical 
efficiency and scale efficiency.  
 
3.  Data  
Data on dairy processing firms in six European countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland 
and the Netherlands) covering the year 2004 come from AMADEUS
2. The data set used for estimation consists 
of 133 firms among which 90 are IOFs and 43 are CFs.  
The model distinguishes one output (total turnover) and three inputs (fixed assets, material cost, and 
employment cost). The outputs and inputs are expressed in Euros of 1996 (base year) by deflating the monetary 
values with their Tornqvist price indexes (Coelli et al., 2005).  
The dairy plants in these countries are typically producing more than one product. However, the only 
relevant output available in the data set is total turnover. Total turnover represents the total operating revenue 
from selling all products produced by the processing company. Turnover (output) is deflated using the countries 
harmonized index of consumer prices for milk, cheese and egg.  
Fixed asset is measured as the value of physical land, buildings, machinery, and the non-physical fixed 
assets: such as the goodwill, patents, brands, and market shares. The value was deflated using the average value 
                                                 
2 AMADEUS is a European financial data base prepared by Bureau van Dijk and contains more than 5 million private, cooperative and 
public companies. The data-base is collected from reports produced by the chamber of commerce of the different European countries. 
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of  the  prices  index  of  the  agricultural  gross  fixed  capital  formation  and  the  price  index  of  the  agricultural 
machinery and equipment per country. 
The AMADEUS data base includes material cost, reflecting the cost of purchasing the input materials 
before the processing operation starts. This input mainly consists of raw milk purchased by the dairy plant. We 
used the deflated EC-index of producer prices of the cows’ milk per country as the deflator for the material cost.  
Labor cost is deflated using  the nominal value of the labor cost index in total industries (excluding public 
administration).  
The price indexes vary over the years and the different countries but not over the firms or over their type, 
implying differences in the composition of inputs and output or quality differences are reflected in the quantity 
(Cox and Wohlgenant, 1986). Additionally, the quantities also reflect differences in prices of the production 
factors between the two types of firms; a higher the milk payment implies a higher quantity of materials.  
Table 1 provides the means and standard deviations of turnover, fixed assets, raw material, labor and prices. 
It shows that CFs have, on average, a higher average value of the output and the three inputs than IOFs. 
 




Dimension  Mean (n)  Standard deviation  
Type    IOFs (90)  CFs (43)  IOFs  CFs 
Quantities 
     Output (turnover)  10
6 Euros  14.37  49.04  47.21  110.39 
     Fixed assets  10
6 Euros  2.40  9.67  5.80  27.36 
     Materials   10
6 Euros  9.64  34.64  4.97  94.92 
     Labor  10
6 Euros  0.28  1.05  0.66  1,52 
Prices 
 Output (turnover)  1996=100  91.83   
     Fixed assets  1996=100  87.54  -- 
    Materials  1996=100  128.59  -- 
    Labor  1996=100  113.14  -- 
 
 
4.  Results 
The results of the DEA models and the bootstrapping measures all were obtained using the package FEAR 
(Wilson, 2008). Section 4.1 presents the results of the traditional approach and Section 4.2 presents the alterative 
approach of the two hyperbolic models.  
 
4.1 The Results of the Traditional approach 
Results in Table 2 show that IOFs, on average, are more technically, scale and allocative efficient than 
CFs, hence, more overall efficient. The CFs are technically less efficient when compared to IOFs, CFs are 
slightly less scale efficient than IOFs, and CFs are less allocatively efficient than IOFs. Using the traditional 
approach, in which firms are considered to minimize cost (and contract the quantity of materials), CFs are out-
performed by IOFs in their technical, scale and allocative efficiencies. Treating the material as an input, which 
has to be minimized, provides us with an expected lower performance of the CFs. On average, the input oriented 
technical efficiency of the IOFs is more than 50 percent higher than the one of the CFs. The results of the 
technical efficiency also reflect differences in for example prices paid for raw materials between CFs and the 
IOFs, where CFs is expected to pay higher total price. On average, the scale efficiency of the IOFs, using the 
traditional approach, is 10 percent higher than the one of the CFs. This difference in scale efficiency suggests 
that CFs are operating on a less optimal size than IOFs. This finding may be due to the fact that CFs are more 
restricted in choosing their optimal size due to their obligation to process all what members provide to the CFs. 
On average, the allocative efficiency of the IOFs is 20 percent higher than the one of the CFs. This difference of 
the allocative efficiency suggests that the CFs are less successful in minimizing costs than IOFs (as assumed to 
be more of profit oriented firms).  The latter finding suggests that CFs may have another objective rather than 
minimizing costs, CFs may be more interested in paying a high milk price to their farmers.   
 
These results do confirm the hypothetical expectations of the CFs performance when compared to the 
IOFs. The difference of the technical and scale efficiencies between the CFs and IOFs are statistically significant   7 
as their confidence intervals do not overlap. Therefore, the overall performance of the CFs using the traditional 
model is lower than the IOFs over all efficiency.  
 
Table  2:  Overall  efficiency  and  its  decomposition  for  CFs  and  IOFs  (95%  confidence  interval  in 
parentheses)  




Overall efficiency  
         
     CFs  0.428 (0.29-0.54)  0.769 (0.71-0.77)   0.416  0.137    
     IOFs  0.642 (0.52-0.71)  0.849 (0.79-0.85)   0.582  0.317    
 
 
4.2 The results of the alternative approach  
Table 3 presents the results of the two hyperbolic efficiency models (model 4 and model 5). Model 4 
expands outputs and contracts materials along with other inputs, whereas model 5 expands outputs and materials 
and contracts the use of other inputs. 
Results of model 4 in Table 3 show that CFs score, on average, 1.659 in the first hyperbolic model 
(model  4)  which  says  that  CFs  can  increase  their  output  with  65.9  percent  contract  their  inputs  (including 
materials) by ( )
659 . 1
1
1 ( - *100 = )39.7 percent. The IOFs, on the other hand, scored on average 1.430 in the 
first hyperbolic model (model 4), which says that the IOFs can expand their output with 43 percent and contract 
their inputs with 30.1 percent. 
CFs score slightly higher in the second hyperbolic model (model 5) than the first hyperbolic model with 
1.638, which says that CFs can on average expand output and materials by 63,8 percent and decrease the use of 
inputs (excluding materials) by ( )
638 . 1
1
1 ( - *100 =) 39.0 percent efficient in contracting their input (excluding 
materials). The IOFs score worse in the second hyperbolic model (model 5) rather than in the first hyperbolic 
model with 1,647, which implies a potential for expansion of outputs and materials by 64,7 percent their and a 
39.3 percent contraction of inputs (excluding materials). When moving from model 4 to model 5, the scale 
efficiency has also improved for the CFs (from 1.21 to 1.10) while it has worsened marginally for the IOFs 
(from 1.09 to 1.10).   
The results of the bootstrapping show that all differences in technical and scale between CFs and the 
IOFs are not significant at the critical 5% level in model 4 and model 5. In the first hyperbolic model (model 4), 
the hyperbolic technical and scale efficiencies of the cooperative (1.659) and (1,21) lie within the confidence 
interval of the hyperbolic technical and scale efficiencies of the IOFs [1,14-1,74] and [0,89- 1,97], respectively. 
The situation is similar for the hyperbolic technical and scale efficiencies of the IOFs (1,430) and (1,091) which 
are also located within the CFs confidence interval for both measures [1,21-1,92] and [0,88-1,47], respectively. 
The bootstrapping results of the second hyperbolic model (model 5) are similar to the results of the first model in 
terms of location within the confidence intervals. The hyperbolic technical and scale efficiencies of CFs (1.638) 
and (1,10) lie within the confidence interval of the hyperbolic technical and scale efficiencies of the IOFs [1,03-
1,97] and [0,73- 1,43], respectively. The situation is similar for the hyperbolic technical and scale efficiencies of 
the IOFs (1,647) and (1,10) which are also located within the CFs confidence interval for both measures [1,09-
2,61] and [0,73-1,43], respectively.   
 




Model (4): Contract Materials  Model (5): Expand Materials 
  Technical Efficiency  Scale Efficiency 
  Technical Efficiency   Scale Efficiency  
CFs  1.659 (1,21-1,92)  1,21 (0.88-1,47)  1.638 (1.09-2,61)  1,10 (0,73-1,43) 
IOFs  1.430 (1,14-1,74)  1,091 (0,89-1,43)  1.647 (1,03-1,97)  1,10 (0.89-1,48) 
 
Although the difference of the measure between the two  is not significant at the critical 5% level, it 
shows that the performance of the CFs improved by 8 percent while the IOFs performance is worsened by 17 
percent when moving from a model that contracts materials to a model that expands materials.  This change of 
the performances between the two models, suggest that CFs are more oriented to increasing material costs (e.g. 
through  a  higher  price),  whereas  IOFs  are  more  focused  on  decreasing  material  costs.    Additionally,  the 
difference of the scale efficiency between the CFs and the IOFs reduced to zero in the second model, which   8 
implies that CFs are more scale efficient when materials and output are expanded rather than when the CFs 
expand only the output while contracting materials and other inputs.  
 
4.3 The performance of the largest CFs and IOFs 
In Appendix A, we present the results of the ten largest CFs and IOFs in terms of turnover. Arla and 
Friesland  are  the  only  two  CFs  which  are  technically  efficient  using  the  traditional  and  both  alternative 
approaches. Campina and Glanbia are only technically efficient using model 1, while Nordmilch is technically 
efficient in both hyperbolic models (model 4 and 5). 
Results in Appendix A show that scale efficiency of the largest CFs is rather poor in both model 1 and 
model 4, and improved significantly using model 5. Nordmilch and Arla are the only two CFs that are scale 
efficient in the second hyperbolic model (model 5). However, Friesland and Campina are the least scale efficient 
using the traditional mdoel and the first hyperbolic model (model 4). The average improvement of the scale 
efficiency from model 4 to model 5 is 19 percent for the ten largest cooperatives and only three percent for the 
ten largest IOFs. 
 The allocative efficiency of the CFs is generally very low, which suggests that the objective of large CFs 
differs from the objective of large IOFs. Among the ten largest IOFs, there are five IOFs technically efficient 
using model 1. The number of technically efficient IOFs drops dramatically (to only two IOFs) when measured 
using model 5; this drop in the number of efficient IOFs in model 5 is in line with the finding in section 3.2 
which showed that IOFs perform worse in model 5 rather than model 1 and 4. More details can be viewed from 
the Appendix. 
     
5.  Conclusions 
 The raison d’etre of cooperatives differs from the one of IOFs. Therefore in order to evaluate the efficiency 
of the cooperatives, a different approach should be considered, i.e. an approach that takes into account the 
different objectives of the owners of the cooperative. Comparing the performance of CFs to the one of the IOFs 
using the same model imposes the same behavioral characteristic on either type of firm. CFs, as user-owned, 
user-controlled and user beneficiary firms are more restricted to members’ interest in processing their own 
production and receiving the highest overall payment for their product which serves as the material to the 
cooperative. Therefore, materials have a different role for CFs rather than for IOFs. The role of material in CFs 
influences the choice of the input bundle by the cooperative firm to produce output, it restricts the choice of the 
optimal size, and implies a deviation from cost minimizing behavior. 
Our empirical  findings  show that, on average, the  CFs under-perform the IOFs in their input-oriented 
technical,  scale,  allocative  efficiencies.    However,  the  performance  of  the  CFs  in  comparison  to  the  IOFs 
improved  when  considering  the  model  that  expands  the  use  of  materials  and  output.  Additionally,  the 
differences in the scale efficiencies between CFs and IOFs disappear. The improvement of technical efficiency 
and the disappearance of the difference in scale efficiency suggest that materials have different roles in CFs and 
IOFs due to different objectives of the two firm types.    
To provide a relevant comparison of the performance of the CFs with the IOFs’ analysts should incorporate the 
interest of the owners of the firm. The overall conclusion is that CFs and IOFs need different tools to evaluate 
their performances, comparing the performance of the CFs to IOFs is not suitable if the same approach is used 
assuming same objectives to the two types of firms.   9 
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Appendix A: The Results of the 10 Largest CFs and IOFs  
  Traditional Models 1-3  Hyperbolic Model 4  Hyperbolic  Model 5 
Name  TE   SE  AE  TE  SE  TE  SE 
Coop                
ARLA FOODS AMBA 





1.00  0.39  0.14  1.00  1.60  1.00  1.06 
ZUIVELCOÖPERATIE 
CAMPINA U.A. 
1.00  0.40  0.18  1.07  1.60  1.06  1.11 
NORDMILCH EG  0.87  0.51  0.12  1.00  1.41  1.00  1.00 
GLANBIA PUBLIC 
LIMITED COMPANY 
1.00  0.61  0.55  1.55  1.33  1.59  1.18 
CANDIA (CEDILAC)  0.44  0.45  0.75  1.48  1.53  2.04  1.20 
BELGOMILK  0.31  0.65  0.64  1.73  1.30  1.87  1.16 
3A SA  0.58  0.55  0.62  1.27  1.39  1.49  1.17 
SODIAAL 
INTERNATIONAL 





0.24  0.68  0.51  1.91  1.29  1.88  1.13 
IOF               
COGESAL MIKO  1.00  0.64  0.54  1.00  1.25  1.00  1.24 
DANONE SA  0.39  0.27  0.74  1.00  1.93  1.59  1.33 
SAS ENTREMONT 
ALLIANCE 
1.00  0.46  0.49  1.00  1.47  1.25  1.41 
NESTLE PRODUITS 
LAITIERS FRAIS 
1.00  0.69  0.61  1.00  1.21  1.00  1.31 





0.74  0.69  0.24  1.13  1.23  1.21  1.36 
SA INGREDIA  1.00  0.55  0.60  1.00  1.36  1.75  1.22 
GLACES THIRIET  0.66  0.73  0.54  1.21  1.20  1.20  1.26 
SAS LAITERIE DU 
VAL D'ANCENIS 
0.71  0.64  0.63  1.14  1.30  1.47  1.22 
MOLKEREI - 
LAITERIE WALHORN 





                                                 
3 It is owned 100 percent by the cooperative Friesland.  